RIGHTFULLY OURS

Introduction

A suggestion by the Supreme Court of India urging the government to consider introducing a Romeo-Juliet clause in the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, has revived debate around whether India’s strict age-of-consent framework unintentionally criminalises consensual relationships between adolescents.

This explainer unpacks what a Romeo and Juliet clause is and how it operates in other jurisdictions. It traces the evolution of the age of consent in India, from the Indian Penal Code to the POCSO Act and subsequent 2013 Criminal Law Amendment, highlighting why the age was raised to eighteen years. It examines the recommendations of the Justice Verma Committee and successive Law Commission reports, as well as early draft versions of the POCSO Bill that contemplated close-in-age exemptions. This explainer also analyses judicial decisions addressing consensual adolescent relationships and the concerns surrounding misuse, trafficking, and exploitation. Finally, it explains why the Supreme Court’s recent observation marks a significant moment in the ongoing conversation on balancing child protection with adolescent autonomy.

What is the Romeo and Juliet clause?

The Supreme Court, in a recent order, following The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & anr judgment, has recommended that the legislature to introduce a ‘Romeo-Juliet’ clause to aid with the misuse of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. But what is this clause? This clause is named after the famous William Shakespeare play that explores the relationship of two love-struck teenagers from rival families. While the exact definition of what Romeo and Juliet law is varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the basic principle that this law follows is that it is typically an exemption or defence to criminal liability based on close age gap, provided that the age gap is no more than four years, generally. So, this law/clause reduces the age of consent for the minor in cases where they have consensual sex with someone close to their age.  

The Romeo Juliet clause acknowledges the developmental similarities of young adolescents in consensual relationships, which also include consensual sexual activities and sexual contact; which are ‘illegal’ because of the strict technicality and inflexibility of the law, because it treats such sexual intercourse as statutory rape due to the rigid age of consent framework. Thus, by acknowledging the developmental similarities, the clause helps separate actual criminal abuse from adolescent relationships. The introduction of this clause would especially help with cases where the POCSO laws are used by parents/relatives of young girls when they disapprove of her relationship. Many countries, such as Canada, Australia, Belgium, and some U.S. states have adopted and implemented some version of this law.

Has this issue been talked about before?

While the matter is in discourse today, this isn’t the first time it has been talked about. The age of consent was 16 years old for nearly 7 decades (from 1949 to 2013) under the Indian Penal Code  (despite the recommendations of 2 law commission reports- the 84^th and the 156^th) before it was changed in 2013 to 18 years by the The Criminal Law (Amendment)Act, 2013 to keep it in line with the POCSO act that was enacted in 2012.

However, even the original POCSO bill introduced in November 2010 by the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights provided multiple close-in-age exemptions, recognising the possibility of 2 adolescents engaging in consensual sexual activities. Some of these exemptions included non-penetrative sexual acts between children above 12 with an age gap not more than 2 years and penetrative sexual acts between children above 14 years with an age gap not exceeding 3 years. The following POCSO bill, 2011, by the Ministry of Women and Child Development advocated for the age of consent to be set at 16 while still defining a child as someone below the age of 18. However, neither of the recommendations by the POCSO bills was implemented in the POCSO Act of 2012.

It was again in 2013 that the Justice Verma committee would recommend keeping the age of consent 16 in the POCSO Act in alignment with the then unamended section IPC 375. This was in agreement with the UN Convention on Rights of the Child, 1989, which boiled down to stopping child sexual assault and exploitation while not criminalising consensual sex between 2 individuals.

The 22^nd Law Commission in the 283^rd report titled ‘Age of consent under the POCSO Act, 2012, 2023’ presents recommendations on the issue of deciding the legal age of consent. Two High Courts (HCs) referred the issue to the commission after observing several cases of non-abusive consensual sex among adolescent partners being prosecuted as offenders under the POCSO Act. The report documents the case Veekesh Kalawat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, where the HC of Madhya Pradesh, in its recommendation to the law commission, requested an amendment in POCSO to give special discretion to senior judges over minimum sentencing in specific POCSO Act cases to account for the unique relationship between parties. He also further suggested that cases involving marriage should allow for alternative sentencing (like community service) instead of mandatory punishment. This reference, along with one other, led to the commission asking the question if reducing the age of consent can reduce the burden on the justice system and stop the criminalisation of adolescent non-abusive relationships.  

For the former, it argues that a total reduction would lead to difficulty in prosecuting child marriage and trafficking cases. For the latter, it argues about hyper-specific cases where free consent can’t be determined in an investigation, and how children can easily be manipulated and groomed by adults. Nonetheless, the commission did agree that amongst the annual number of POCSO cases registered, an overwhelming number are consensual close-in-age cases. Despite this acknowledgement, the report, due to its own prejudice and positivism, continues to treat adolescents as a subset of children that still need protection and are unable to make their own decisions without external forces. So, it neither suggested a reduction in the age of consent nor a total blanket or partial closure in age. The final recommendation was thus an alternative to grant enhanced judicial discretion during sentencing. The Commission suggested the term “Tacit Approval” to describe consensual adolescent relationships where consent is de facto but not de jure.

Even before the recommendations of law commissions, it has been the Indian Judiciary that has been dealing with cases revolving around consensual adolescent relationships. It has been trying to find the balance between law and justice. They have expressed their concerns in multiple judgments across cases.

In the landmark case of Lajja Devi v. State (Delhi) 2012, where the Delhi HC held that no straightjacket formulas could be applied, and courts must take into consideration the circumstances, age gap, maturity, etc, and safeguard personal liberty of the people involved. The same case was later cited in 2025 in State v. Hitesh by the Delhi HC itself, where the accused was acquitted by the high court after it reiterated that love is a fundamental human experience and adolescents have the same right to make human connections, and the law should acknowledge the relationship as long as consent obtained isn’t coerced.

In case Sabari v. The Inspector of Police & Ors., Madras HC said that consensual relationships between adolescents who are infatuated should not come within the arena of the POCSO Act, 2012. Similarly, in Veekesh Kalawat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Gwalior bench had heard a case concerning a teenage girl who ran away with an adult boy, the relationship then resulting in a child. The bench iterated that cases like this did more harm than good when the sole breadwinners of such families are sent to prison on a POCSO charge for at least 10 years, it makes the ‘victim’ and their children (if any) more vulnerable to social exploitation. The enforcement of a very rigid POCSO does gross injustice in an attempt to right a wrong.

While these are just a few examples, there have been 100s, if not more, such cases across state boundaries where the unnecessary judicial intervention not only increases the burden on the system but also prosecutes innocent adolescents in love. 

Finally, on January 9^th 2026, in the State of Uttar Pradesh v Anurudh and Another, the Supreme Court finally addressed this issue after the centre refused to reduce the age of consent to 16, attesting to reasons of trafficking, exploitation and immaturity in Nipun Saxena v Union of India last year. Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N Kotiswar Singh took judicial notice of the recurring misuse of the POCSO Act in cases involving consensual adolescent relationships. the court observed that genuine adolescent relationships were being unnecessarily drawn into the criminal justice system due to the rigid statutory framework. The Court noted the absence of any legislative mechanism to distinguish between exploitative conduct and consensual age-proximate relationships and suggested that the Union Government consider introducing a Romeo and Juliet clause to prevent such outcomes.

Why does the Supreme Court’s recent suggestion matter for POCSO reform?

The issue of legal reform to the POCSO Act to accommodate consensual adolescent relationships has been in discourse since if not before, the law was even implemented. So why does the recent Supreme Court suggestion feel so significant? This is because, before this judgment, the discourse was largely academic or confined to select legal circles, despite it being discussed on multiple national law commission reports. This moment feels significant because this is the first time the highest court of the country has formally recognised and raised an issue with the POCSO Act being misused to criminalise adolescent relationships and urged the government to consider a specific clause. This act has extended the visibility of this issue from a select few to everyone who reads a newspaper. It has opened more doors for activism and a demand for policy change. This judgment is a starting point for reimagining child protection laws in a manner that is protective and just. It invites Parliament to craft a nuanced framework that distinguishes exploitation from age-proximate consent without weakening protections against abuse, trafficking, or child marriage.

The way forward, therefore, requires calibrated and carefully drafted reform. Any amendment introducing a close-in-age exemption must be carefully crafted. It should clearly define the permissible age gap, require demonstrable consent between parties, and expressly exclude situations involving coercion, authority, grooming, or exploitation. Such a provision must operate as a limited defence to criminal liability rather than a blanket reduction of the age of consent. Clearer investigative guidelines are essential to prevent unnecessary arrests and prolonged trials in consensual cases. Enhanced judicial discretion at the stage of sentencing could also ensure justice where rigid mandatory minimums lead to unjust outcomes.

Ultimately, reform must strike a principled balance: safeguarding children from abuse while recognising adolescent agency. A nuanced framework would strengthen the legitimacy of child protection law by ensuring it targets exploitation without inadvertently criminalising consensual youth relationships.